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Introduction
The State charged Appellant Patrick Galindo with attempted murder and
possession of a firearm by a restricted person. Before trial, his counsel raised the
question of his competency. The Utah Code provides that a person is incompetent
to stand trial if he “is suffering from . . . mental retardation resulting . . . in . . . his
inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings against
him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” Utah Code Ann. §§ 7715-1, 77-15-2 (West).1 The trial court ordered two psychological evaluations of Mr.
Galindo to assess his competency.
One of the psychological evaluations listed Mr. Galindo’s IQ at 54, plus or
minus 5—well below the mental retardation threshold score of 70. R.56, 60. This
psychologist also explained that trial counsel for Mr. Galindo was unavailable to
discuss Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him and to rationally participate in
the proceedings before the evaluation was filed. R.65.

Mr. Galindo was charged July, 6 2016. The language of Utah Code Ann. section
77-15-2 changed in relevant part in May, 2018, to provide that a person is
competent to stand trial if he has
(a) a rational and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings
against the defendant and of the punishment specified for the offense
charged; and
(b) the ability to consult with the defendant’s legal counsel with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding in order to assist in the
defense.
1

1

The other psychologist used another test, the WASI test, to assess Mr.
Galindo’s mental capacity. R.45. He reported that Mr. Galindo’s score of T=33
placed him in the fifth percentile. R.45. This psychologist also admitted that Mr.
Galindo’s intellectual disability impacted his ability to understand what was
going on in court. R.48.
Both psychologists deemed Mr. Galindo competent to stand trial, even
though they left the final determination of his competency up to the court. At the
competency hearing, trial counsel for Mr. Galindo stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s
competency rather than raising and bringing to the court’s attention the many
issues the reports presented. The trial court relied on trial counsel’s stipulation
when it found Mr. Galindo competent to stand trial.
A jury later found Mr. Galindo guilty of attempted murder. Mr. Galindo
then pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a restricted person for handling the
gun the night of the shooting.
Issues Presented
Issue 1: Did trial counsel provide ineffective assistance when he stipulated
to Mr. Galindo’s competency?
Standard of Review: “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for
the first time on appeal presents a question of law.” State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶
6, 89 P.3d 162.
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Preservation: An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is an “exception to
the preservation requirement.” State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ¶ 35, 276 P.3d
1207.
Issue 2: Did trial counsel provide ineffective assistance when he failed to
talk with the court-appointed psychologists to discuss Mr. Galindo’s ability to
counsel with him and to participate at trial?
Standard of Review: “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for
the first time on appeal presents a question of law.” Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6.
Preservation: Ineffective assistance of counsel is an “exception to the
preservation requirement.” Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ¶ 35. Because this claim
relies on facts outside of the record, Mr. Galindo has filed a Rule 23B motion
concurrently with this brief.
Issue 3: Do the above errors cumulate to warrant reversal on appeal
because together they raise sufficient doubt as to whether Mr. Galindo should
have been found competent to stand trial?
Standard of Review: “When reviewing a claim of cumulative error,
[appellate courts] apply the standard of review applicable to each underlying
claim of error.” State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶ 53, 397 P.3d 626 (quotation
omitted). “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on
appeal presents a question of law.” Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6.
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Preservation: Cumulative error based on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel circumvents this court’s preservation requirement. State v. Low, 2008
UT 58, ¶ 19, 192 P.3d 867.
Statement of the Case
1.

Somebody shot Ramon Guzman
Late one night, two men were walking down a street in downtown Ogden

when they “seen two people hanging out of the window” from an apartment
above them. R.929. The two groups yelled fighting words at each other, and
Ramon Guzman told the men in the apartment to “bring it over here mother
f*cker.” R.418; R.841; R.929. Three men exited the apartment, crossed the street,
and confronted the two men—who at that point were brandishing knives. R.932;
R.853. The two groups did not know each other. Mr. Guzman thought they were
going to fight, but almost immediately, the middle of the three assailants shot
him four times and turned and fled. R843. The gun was later found in the bushes
near the apartment building. R.716.
Mr. Guzman—who survived the shooting—said he got a good look at his
shooter. R.845. He later identified Mr. Galindo as the shooter in a photo line-up.
R.880–81. Mr. Galindo’s fingerprints were also found on the gun’s magazine.
R.504–05.
The police charged Mr. Galindo with attempted murder, felony discharge
of a firearm, and possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person. R.1. The
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State dropped the charge of felony discharge of a firearm and the trial court held
a bifurcated trial, trying only the issue of whether it was Mr. Galindo or someone
else who shot Mr. Guzman on the street. R.148; R.1260.
2.

The competency determination
Before trial, trial counsel asked the court to evaluate Mr. Galindo’s

competency. R.34. As the basis for the competency evaluation, trial counsel
stated, “In conversing with Mr. Galindo, in the past several court hearings, Mr.
Galindo does not appear to be able to comprehend what is going on. Or make
rational decisions regarding this case.” R.37. The court ordered two psychologists
to examine Mr. Galindo. R.38.
One of the psychologists who examined Mr. Galindo was Dr. Rick Hawks.
The Hawks Report placed Mr. Galindo on the schizophrenia spectrum due to the
voices that Mr. Galindo reported hearing. R.56. It listed his depression and
anxiety, as well as borderline and antisocial personality disorders. R.56. It
detailed Mr. Galindo’s suicidal ideations and his past attempt at suicide and selfmutilation. R.60.
The Hawks Report reported that Mr. Galindo’s IQ “fell within the mental
retardation/intellectual impairment range of intellectual functioning”—it
reported his IQ as 54, plus or minus 5. R.56; R.60. Mental retardation “is clearly
defined by the American Psychiatric Association” as having a measured IQ of 70
and below. R.60. The Hawks Report also stated that Dr. Hawks had not been able
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to speak with Mr. Galindo’s trial counsel before making his ultimate conclusion
regarding Mr. Galindo’s competence, despite an attempt to contact him during
the course of the evaluation. R.65.
The other psychologist who examined Mr. Galindo was Dr. Renée
Wilkinson. Like the Hawks Report, the Wilkinson Report weighed in on Mr.
Galindo’s intelligence. Using the WASI test (Weschler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence), the Wilkinson Report placed Mr. Galindo at an IQ score of T=33,
placing him in the fifth percentile. R.45. The Wilkinson Report initially stated
that Mr. Galindo “is not able to consult with his attorney and participate in the
proceeding against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,” but
concluded that Mr. Galindo was competent to proceed to trial anyway. R.41. The
Wilkinson Report also acknowledged that Mr. Galindo was “confused by what is
being discussed in court,” but stated that if he was confused he could “ask his
attorney to explain matters to him.” R.48.
At the hearing to determine Mr. Galindo’s competency, trial counsel
stipulated that Mr. Galindo was competent to stand trial. R.378. The trial court
relied on trial counsel’s stipulation, stating, “Based on the two reports and
stipulation of counsel the Court will enter a finding then that Mr. Galindo is
competent to proceed.” R.379.
At trial, the State admitted evidence that the victim identified Mr. Galindo
as his shooter from a photo lineup. R.880. A police officer testified that in
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another photo lineup, the victim’s friend—the only other eyewitness close enough
to identify the shooter—picked out one of Mr. Galindo’s friends as the shooter
with 100% certainty. R.1000–05.
A gun found near the crime scene was also admitted into evidence. R.437,
757. No fingerprints were recovered from the gun, R.1047, but Mr. Galindo’s
fingerprints were found on the magazine, R.1034–45. The gun’s DNA testing was
inconclusive because there were too many DNA samples to narrow down the
result. R.823–26.
After the State rested, the defense admitted evidence that Mr. Galindo was
in the bathroom with his on-again off-again girlfriend “messing around” at the
moment of the shooting. R.1093–95. Girlfriend also explained that a gun was
present at the party that night and that the guys looked at it and handled it—
including Mr. Galindo. R.1091. She testified that she and Mr. Galindo left the
bathroom after they heard shouting, and that they ran outside but that she never
lost sight of Mr. Galindo. R.1095–1103. During examination of a police witness,
defense counsel admitted evidence that the police refused to interview Girlfriend
when she contacted them about the case. R.915.
The defense also admitted evidence that there was another prime suspect
who was never actually investigated—the tenant of the apartment where Mr.
Galindo had spent the evening. R.1008. Defense counsel discovered that the
police never showed a photo of the tenant in a photo lineup to any of the
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witnesses—including the victim and his friend—who were asked to identify the
shooter. R.902, 1008–09.
A jury found Mr. Galindo guilty of attempted murder. R.1248.
3.

23B Evidence
Mr. Galindo’s trial counsel has submitted an affidavit detailing what he

would have told Dr. Hawks had he communicated with Dr. Hawks while Dr.
Hawks was writing his report. (See Randy Richards Aff. Add D.) Trial counsel’s
affidavit explained:
• It was abundantly clear that Mr. Galindo was intellectually disabled;
• Mr. Galindo was unable to assist with preparation for trial;
• Mr. Galindo could not give his trial counsel information about the
incident, making it impossible to get adequate witnesses for the
defense;
• Mr. Galindo did not appear to be able to understand the
proceedings;
• Mr. Galindo would agree with anything trial counsel suggested;
• Trial counsel tested Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him at trial
by asking him two questions in a row, both suggesting totally
opposite answers;
• Mr. Galindo would respond in the affirmative to two totally opposing
questions in a row;
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• Mr. Galindo was conversant and happy and did not understand the
gravity of the offenses and did not understand there was a possibility
he could lose at trial;
• Had counsel connected with Dr. Hawks, counsel would have been
able to give him information as to his frustrations trying to prepare a
defense for Mr. Galindo due to his inability to understand the gravity
of the charges;
• Mr. Galindo could not adequately testify at trial;
• Under normal circumstances, trial counsel would have put Mr.
Galindo on the stand to explain where he was at the time of the
shooting, but it was impossible due to Mr. Galindo’s intellectual
disability, his inability to understand complex questions, and his
total inability to be able to withstand any kind of cross examination.
(Randy Richards Aff. Add. D.).
Summary of the Argument
Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he stipulated
to Mr. Galindo’s competency to withstand trial in light of the findings in the
psychologists’ reports. The psychologists’ reports indicated that Mr. Galindo’s IQ
placed him far below the mental retardation range, that he was struggling to
understand the proceedings, and that he was unable to participate or counsel
with his attorney in a rational way. But counsel stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s
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competence anyway. Because the trial court relied on counsel’s stipulation, this
error harmed Mr. Galindo.
Trial counsel likewise provided ineffective assistance when he failed to
discuss with one psychologist Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him at trial or
to participate in the proceedings against him. In a rule 23B affidavit, trial counsel
admits that had he spoken with the psychologist while the psychologist was
preparing his report, he would have provided details supporting a finding of
incompetence. There is no conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel’s decision
not to discuss Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him and participate in the
proceedings when trial counsel himself requested a psychological evaluation and
competency hearing.
In light of the above, cumulative error demands reversal. Had Mr. Galindo
gotten a hearing where the psychologists and trial court considered the evidence
included in trial counsel’s affidavit coupled with a vigorous—or even competent—
argument from trial counsel that Mr. Galindo could not participate in his own
defense, the outcome of the competency hearing would have been quite different.
Trial counsel’s double-whammy of (1) stipulating to competency and (2) utterly
failing to talk to Dr. Hawks left Mr. Galindo—for all intents and purposes—
without an advocate. These two issues should cumulate to obliterate this court’s
confidence in the outcome of Mr. Galindo’s competency hearing.
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Argument
1.

Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he stipulated
to Mr. Galindo’s competency
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have Assistance
of counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. That right is now recognized
as the right to “effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 fn. 14 (1970) (emphasis added) (“It has long been recognized that the
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”).
To show constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Galindo
must show (1) error, i.e. “that [his] counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2)
“that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
1.1

It was error for trial counsel to stipulate to competency
under the circumstances

Mr. Galindo’s trial counsel erred when he stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s
competency in light of the findings in the psychologists’ reports.
To show attorney error, Mr. Galindo must show “that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering all
the circumstances.” State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶ 23, 309 P.3d 1160.
Furthermore, “the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”
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Id. In other words, he must show “that there was no conceivable tactical basis for
counsel’s actions.” State v. Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶ 32, 414 P.3d 559.
The Utah Code provides that “no person who is incompetent shall be tried
for a public offense.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1 (West). For purposes of trial
a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from
a mental disorder or mental retardation resulting either
in:
(1)
his inability to have a rational and factual
understanding of the proceedings against him or of the
punishment specified for the offense charged; or
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to
participate in the proceedings against him with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding
Id. § 77-15-2. Thus, in statutory shorthand, Mr. Galindo could be incompetent to
stand trial if he was “suffering from . . . mental retardation resulting . . . in . . . his
ability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings against
him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” Id.
Trial counsel asked for a review of Mr. Galindo’s competency because, he
stated, “In conversing with Mr. Galindo, in the past several court hearings, Mr.
Galindo does not appear to be able to comprehend what is going on. Or make
rational decisions regarding this case.” R.37.
The subsequent psychologists’ reports confirmed trial counsel’s
observations. The Hawks Report concluded that Mr. Galindo’s IQ was 54, plus or
minus 5—falling “within the mental retardation/intellectual impairment range of
intellectual functioning.” R.56; R.60. The Wilkinson Report used the WASI test,
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which placed Mr. Galindo’s IQ at 33—landing him in the bottom fifth percentile.
R.45. The Wilkinson Report also stated that Mr. Galindo “is not able to consult
with his attorney and participate in the proceeding against him with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding.” R.41. That report also acknowledged Mr.
Galindo’s confusion in court. R.48.
All of this comes together to paint a very clear picture of a person who “is
incompetent to proceed” because “he is suffering from . . . mental retardation
resulting . . . in his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.”
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2.
Trial counsel is not faulted with erring if, under an objective standard of
reasonableness, there is any tactical basis for his actions. Campos, 2013 UT App
213, ¶ 23; Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶ 32. Trial counsel is also granted the
head-start of receiving the presumption that “the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy.” Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶ 23.
There can be no sound trial strategy that includes sending a cognitively
impaired client to stand trial for a crime he maintains he never committed. That
is not tactical or objectively reasonable. Trial counsel believed Mr. Galindo was
impaired enough to ask the court to examine his competency because “in the past
several court hearings, Mr. Galindo does not appear to be able to comprehend
what is going on. Or make rational decisions regarding this case.” R.37.

13

After receiving reports stating that medical professionals had determined
that Mr. Galindo’s low IQ did indeed place him well within the mental
retardation range, that Mr. Galindo was struggling to understand the
proceedings, and that he was “not able to consult with his attorney and
participate in the proceeding against him with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding,” R.41; Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2, there is no conceivable tactical
basis for trial counsel’s stipulation to competency.
1.2

Trial counsel’s stipulation to competency harmed Mr.
Galindo, because the trial court relied on it instead of
conducting its own review of the issue

In addition to showing error, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id.
A person may meet the statutory incompetency test in many ways. One way
is to show
(1) that you are “suffering from . . . mental retardation
resulting . . . in”
(2) “[your] inability to consult with [] counsel and to
participate in the proceedings against [you] with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding.”
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (West) (emphases added).
The mental retardation aspect of the test is clearly met in Mr. Galindo:
mental retardation “is clearly defined by the American Psychiatric Association” as
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having a measured IQ of 70 and below. R.60. Mr. Galindo’s IQ is reportedly
about 54, plus or minus 5, which is on his best day somewhere closer to 59—still
11 points shy of 70. And one report stated he was in the bottom fifth percentile.
R.45.
What’s more, one report in no uncertain terms stated that he was “not able
to consult with his attorney and participate in the proceeding against him with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding.” R.41; Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2.
But at the competency hearing, trial counsel failed to argue on Mr.
Galindo’s behalf that Mr. Galindo was incompetent even though, as the
psychologists’ reports indicated, his IQ placed him far below the mental
retardation range, he was struggling to understand the proceedings, and he was
unable to participate or counsel with his attorney in a rational way. R.41.
Instead, at the competency hearing, trial counsel stipulated that Mr.
Galindo was competent to stand trial. R.378. And the trial court relied on trial
counsel’s stipulation, giving as one of its reasons for entering a finding of
“competent to proceed” the “stipulation of counsel.” R.379.
Had trial counsel argued the above to the court and provided the court with
personal accounts of dealings with Mr. Galindo, the court would have at least had
an opportunity to assess Mr. Galindo’s competency instead of relying on the
stipulation. Surely had counsel not stipulated to competency, the court would
have seen that Mr. Galindo’s incompetency precluded him from standing trial. At
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the very least, this court’s confidence in the outcome of the competency
proceeding should be seriously undermined.

2.

Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to
talk with Mr. Galindo’s psychologist to discuss Mr. Galindo’s
ability to counsel with him at trial or to participate in the
proceedings
Trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when he failed

to discuss with one psychologist Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him at trial
or to participate in the proceedings against him.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Galindo must show (1) error,
i.e. “that [his] counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
2.1

Trial counsel erred when he failed to discuss his
observations with Dr. Hawks, who was assessing his
client’s competency at his own request

To show attorney error, Mr. Galindo must show “that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering all
the circumstances,” “overcom[ing] the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”
Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶ 23.
Before trial was scheduled, trial counsel requested that the court evaluate
Mr. Galindo’s competency. R.34. As the basis for the competency evaluation, trial
counsel stated, “In conversing with Mr. Galindo, in the past several court
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hearings, Mr. Galindo does not appear to be able to comprehend what is going
on. Or make rational decisions regarding this case.” R.37. The court ordered two
psychologists to examine Mr. Galindo. R.38. The Hawks Report explained that
Dr. Hawks had not been able to speak with Mr. Galindo’s trial counsel before
making his ultimate conclusion regarding Mr. Galindo’s competence, despite an
attempt to contact him during the course of the evaluation. R.65.
Trial counsel called for the evaluation himself based upon his belief that his
client was incompetent to stand trial. Trial counsel has submitted an affidavit
explaining why he believed—and still believes—his client was incompetent to
stand trial. (Randy Richards Aff. Add. D.); see infra § 2.2 (including the
substance of the affidavit in arguing prejudice). That affidavit supports a finding
a finding that Mr. Galindo could not participate in the trial or counsel with his
trial counsel meaningfully. Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2.
In light of trial counsel’s belief that his client was incompetent to stand
trial, there is no conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel’s decision not to
discuss Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him and participate in the
proceedings when trial counsel requested a psychological evaluation and
competency hearing himself. See Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶ 32.
2.2

Trial counsel’s failure to talk to Dr. Hawks harmed Mr.
Galindo, as Dr. Hawks could not consider trial counsel’s
own personal interactions with Mr. Galindo in making his
conclusions
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A “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id.
Mr. Galindo has filed a rule 23B motion concurrently with this brief. Rule
23B motions are used to “supplement the record with known facts needed for an
appellant to assert an ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct appeal.” State v.
Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, ¶ 15, 317 P.3d 968 (internal quotation marks omitted).
These motions must
(1) contain a nonspeculative allegation of facts that
(2) do not fully appear in the record, which, if true,
(3) could support a determination that counsel’s performance was
deficient, and
(4) demonstrate that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result.
Id. Additionally, rule 23B motions must “be accompanied by affidavits . . . that
show the claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed
deficient performance.” Utah R. App. P. 23B(b).
In an affidavit to this court supporting a 23B motion for remand, trial
counsel tells this court what he would have told Dr. Hawks:
• It was abundantly clear that Mr. Galindo was intellectually disabled;
• Mr. Galindo was unable to assist with preparation for trial;
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• Mr. Galindo could not give trial counsel information about the
incident, making it impossible to get adequate witnesses for the
defense;
• Mr. Galindo did not appear to be able to understand the
proceedings;
• Mr. Galindo would agree with anything trial counsel suggested;
• Trial counsel tested Mr. Galindo’s ability to counsel with him at trial
by asking him two questions in a row, both suggesting totally
opposite answers;
• Mr. Galindo would respond in the affirmative to two totally opposing
questions in a row;
• Mr. Galindo was conversant and happy and did not understand the
gravity of the offenses and did not understand there was a possibility
he could lose at trial;
• Had he connected with Dr. Hawks, trial counsel would have been
able to give him information as to his frustrations trying to prepare a
defense for Mr. Galindo due to his inability to understand the gravity
of the charges;
• Mr. Galindo could not adequately testify at trial;
• Under normal circumstances, trial counsel would have put Mr.
Galindo on the stand to explain where he was at the time of the
attempted murder, but it was impossible due to Mr. Galindo’s
19

intellectual disability, his inability to understand complex questions,
and his total inability to be able to withstand any kind of cross
examination;
(Randy Richards Aff. Add. D.).
Together, the evidence of trial counsel’s interactions with Mr. Galindo and
the undisputed conclusions in the psychologists’ reports that Mr. Galindo was
suffering from mental retardation would have led the court to conclude that Mr.
Galindo was incompetent.
A person is incompetent if he is (1) suffering from mental retardation that
results in (2) his inability to consult with counsel and participate in the criminal
proceedings with a reasonable degree of understanding. Utah Code Ann. § 77-152 (West) (emphases added).
Mr. Galindo undisputedly meets the first prong: he was suffering from
mental retardation. Mental retardation “is clearly defined by the American
Psychiatric Association” as having a measured IQ of 70 and below. R.60. The
Hawks Report reported that Mr. Galindo’s IQ “fell within the mental
retardation/intellectual impairment range of intellectual functioning”—it
reported his IQ as 54, plus or minus 5. R.56; R.60. The Wilkinson Report placed
Mr. Galindo at an IQ score of T=33, placing him in the fifth percentile. R.45.
Mr. Galindo also meets the second prong: he was unable to consult with his
attorney and participate in the proceedings with a reasonable degree of
understanding. Trial counsel’s affidavit explains that Mr. Galindo was unable to

20

assist with preparation for trial; could not give trial counsel information about
the incident, making it impossible to get adequate witnesses for the defense; did
not appear to be able to understand the proceedings; and would agree with
anything trial counsel suggested. (Randy Richards Aff. Add. D.). In fact, trial
counsel had a haunch that Mr. Galindo was not able to comprehend what he was
suggesting, and so he tested Mr. Galindo’s consistency and ability to counsel with
him at trial by asking him two questions in a row, both suggesting totally opposite
answers. Id. Mr. Galindo would respond in the affirmative to both questions.
Aside from not being able to counsel with his trial attorney, his trial
attorney also did not believe Mr. Galindo was mentally equipped to withstand
testifying on the stand—an option that should be available to all defendants. But
trial counsel attests that Mr. Galindo could not adequately testify at trial because
of his intellectual disability, his inability to understand complex questions, and
his total inability to be able to withstand any kind of cross examination. (Randy
Richards Aff. Add. D.).
Had Mr. Galindo’s trial counsel spoken with Dr. Hawks, all of this
information would have been available to the doctor and to the trial court. Not
only could Dr. Hawks had tested Mr. Galindo in the way that counsel did, but the
trial court itself could have tested him for consistency in answering questions.
And not only would the doctor’s assessment of Mr. Galindo’s competency likely
have changed, but on its own accord the court’s assessment would also likely have
changed.
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3.

The above errors cumulate to warrant reversal on appeal
because together they raise sufficient doubt as to whether Mr.
Galindo should have been found competent to stand trial
Trial counsel committed two prejudicial errors here. First, trial counsel

stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s competency after he called for an evaluation and
hearing on the matter and in the face of evidence that Mr. Galindo was indeed
incompetent to stand trial. See supra § 1. And the trial court relied in part on that
stipulation. And second, trial counsel failed to discuss his observations and
interactions with Mr. Galindo with Dr. Hawks in support of the Hawks Report.
See supra § 2. Each of these errors standing alone caused sufficient prejudice to
warrant reversal. But if this court considers that the prejudice stemming from
these errors individually is insufficient to reverse, then it should apply the
cumulative error doctrine.
“Under the doctrine of cumulative prejudice, [an appellate court] will
reverse if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence
that a fair trial was had.” State v. King, 2017 UT App 43, ¶ 38, 392 P.3d 997
(quotation omitted). “In assessing a claim of cumulative error, [appellate courts]
consider all the identified errors, as well as any errors [the courts] assume may
have occurred.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When reviewing a claim
of cumulative error, [appellate courts] apply the standard of review applicable to
each underlying claim of error.” State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶ 53, 397
P.3d 626 (quotation omitted).
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For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendants must prove
prejudice flowing from trial counsel’s error. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. In the
prejudice inquiry, trial counsel’s deficiencies must often be considered
cumulatively as a whole, not item-by-item. See id. at 695; see also Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397 (2000).
“When counsel’s representation is deficient in several respects, we do not
try to measure the result of each individual error; instead we evaluate how the
errors affected the overall fairness of the proceeding.” United States v. Medlock,
645 Fed. App’x 810 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694–95
(repeatedly stating prejudice inquiry in aggregate terms); see also Pavel v.
Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 2001) (examining the cumulative weight of
defense counsel’s flaws rather than the effect of them standing alone).
“[C]umulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the errors that
individually have been found to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it
analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of trial is such that
collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.” United States v.
Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc). “Unless an aggregate
harmlessness determination can be made, collective error will mandate reversal,
just as surely as will individual error that cannot be considered harmless.” Id; see
State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 97, 322 P.3d 624 (reciting test for cumulative
error).
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This court should remand here. The errors present in this case concerning
the competency hearing are numerous. Trial counsel erred when he stipulated to
Mr. Galindo’s competency and when he failed to discuss his interactions with Mr.
Galindo with Dr. Hawks. Both issues on appeal go to whether Mr. Galindo should
have been tried at all.
Trial counsel should never have stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s competency
when there was so much evidence supporting a determination of incompetence.
There was more than enough evidence that Mr. Galindo satisfied the mental
retardation aspect of the incompetency test. See R.60 (mental retardation “is
clearly defined by the American Psychiatric Association” as having a measured IQ
of 70 and below). Mr. Galindo’s IQ is reportedly about 54, plus or minus 5, which
is on his best day somewhere closer to 59—still 11 points shy of 70. Another
report stated he was in the bottom fifth percentile. R.45. And one of the reports in
no uncertain terms stated that Mr. Galindo was “not able to consult with his
attorney and participate in the proceeding against him with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding.” R.41; Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2.
And had trial counsel made himself available to discuss his interactions
with Mr. Galindo with Dr. Hawks so that they could be included in the Hawks
Report, even more evidence would have supported a finding that. Trial counsel’s
affidavit affirms that Mr. Galindo was unable to assist with preparation for trial
and could not give trial counsel information about the incident, making it
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impossible for him to get adequate witnesses for Mr. Galindo’s defense. He states
that Mr. Galindo did not appear to be able to understand the proceedings and
would agree with anything trial counsel suggested—even if the answers opposed
each other. (Randy Richards Aff. Add. D.). What’s more, trial counsel did not
believe that Mr. Galindo could adequately testify at trial because of his
intellectual disability, his inability to understand complex questions, and his total
inability to be able to withstand any kind of cross examination. (Randy Richards
Aff. Add. D.).
In light of the above, the result of Mr. Galindo’s competency hearing is far
from trustworthy. Imagine a hearing where the doctors and trial court could
consider the evidence included in trial counsel’s affidavit coupled with a
vigorous—or even competent—argument from trial counsel on Mr. Galindo’s
behalf. Trial counsel would have argued that Mr. Galindo was without a doubt
unable to counsel him in preparation for his defense or to participate in
defending the charges against him. And counsel would have provided details to
the court supported his allegations. The outcome of that hearing could have been
quite different than the outcome of the hearing Mr. Galindo got.
Trial counsel’s double-whammy of (1) stipulating to competency and (2)
failing to talk to Dr. Hawks amounts to almost total silence from trial counsel. At
his competency, Mr. Galindo—for all intents and purposes—was left without an
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advocate. These two issues should cumulate to obliterate this court’s confidence
in the outcome of Mr. Galindo’s competency hearing.
Conclusion
Mr. Galindo didn’t get a fair shake at his competency hearing. Trial counsel
stipulated to Mr. Galindo’s competency when both psychologists’ reports
indicated that Mr. Galindo’s IQ placed him far below the mental retardation
range.
Trial counsel likewise failed to discuss with one psychologist Mr. Galindo’s
lack of ability to counsel with him at trial or to participate in the proceedings
against him. There is no conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel’s decision not
to discuss the case with him when trial counsel himself requested the evaluation
and competency hearing.
Cumulative error demands reversal here. For all intents and purposes, trial
counsel’s errors left Mr. Galindo without an advocate at his competency hearing.
This court’s confidence in the outcome of Mr. Galindo’s competency hearing
should be shattered.
DATED this 26th day of July, 2018.
/s/ Cherise Bacalski
Cherise Bacalski (15084)
BACALSKI LEGAL PLLC
51 W. Center Street, #315
Orem, UT 84057
cherisebacalski@gmail.com
(858) 215-1388
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1

OGDEN, UTAH - NOVEMBER 16, 2016

2

JUDGE ERNIE W. JONES PRESIDING

3

(Transcriber’s note:

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

5

Speaker identification

PROCEEDINGS

6

THE COURT:

All right.

This is state versus

7

Patrick Galindo, it's case 2013, 2681 and 1398, and we

8

did a competency evaluation.

9

from Dr. Wilkinson and one from Dr. Hawks.

I have two reports, one
I believe

10

both of those indicates that Mr. Galindo was competent to

11

proceed; is that how you read that?

12

MR. RICHARDS:

That's the way I read it as well.

13

I didn't personally talk to Mr. Hawks or Dr. Hawks, I

14

should say, and confirm that as well.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. RICHARDS:

Okay.
So given that, I think we're

17

willing to stipulate to competent based on those two

18

reports.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21
22
23

Okay.
And we'd like to set a

preliminary hearing on the matter.
THE COURT:

All right.

And the state have any

objection to that finding?

24

MR. ARNOLD:

25

THE COURT:

No, your Honor, thank you.
All right.

Based on the two reports
3
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1

and stipulation of counsel the Court will enter a finding

2

then that Mr. Galindo is competent to proceed, and we

3

want to set a prelim then on case 19 -- or 1398, right?

4

MR. RICHARDS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. RICHARDS:

7

THE COURT:

Correct.

Attempted homicide.
Yes.

And do you want the affidavits just

8

to trail for now or --

9

MR. RICHARDS:

10
11

Yeah, that would be what we would

like, yes.
THE COURT:

All right.

12

we're gonna need on the prelim?

13

MR. RICHARDS:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. RICHARDS:

16

THE COURT:

How long do you think

I think one day's plenty.

One day, or?
Yes one.

What are you thinking in terms of

17

your schedules, do you want me to try for December some

18

time, or --

19
20
21
22

MR. ARNOLD:

I am going to work with both my

schedule and Mr. Shaw's schedule.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I just had a case go off on

December 1, I don't know if that gives you enough time.

23

MR. ARNOLD:

That's --

24

THE COURT:

Too quick?

25

MR. ARNOLD:

Yeah.
4
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

MR. ARNOLD:

3

THE COURT:

Yes.
Too quick.

Okay.

I kind of thought so.

I've

4

also got some time in the last -- the end of December, I

5

don't know if that's too -- I've got the 27th, 29th and

6

30th all open.

7

MR. RICHARDS:

8

MR. ARNOLD:

9

THE COURT:

11

MR. ARNOLD:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. ARNOLD:

Oh, isn't he?
I believe he's -Is he gone the whole week?
He's going to be gone from

Christmas until after the new year.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. ARNOLD:

17

THE COURT:

18

Mr. Shaw is unavailable that last

week.

10

14

I could do the 27th.

Okay, so we're looking at January?
Yes.
How about the third or the 5th of

January, I've got those days open.

19

MR. ARNOLD:

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. ARNOLD:

You know, I'm currently -Third I have a trial.

Okay.
And on the 6th, I start a murder

23

trial in Judge Bean's court and that runs through the

24

17th.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.
5
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1
2

MR. ARNOLD:
schedule that way.

3
4

We just kind of have an odd

THE COURT:

Couldn't do it on the 5th?

say the 6th?

5

MR. ARNOLD:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. RICHARDS:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. ARNOLD:

The 6th is when I begin that trial.
How long does it go?

17th?

11

MR. ARNOLD:
at the wrong month.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

We're in February, right?

MR. RICHARDS:

12

No, January.
Okay.

Oh, excuse me, I was looking

How about the 24th of January, I've

got that open?

15

MR. RICHARDS:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. ARNOLD:

I could do the 24th of January.

Okay.
That would be fine, we could find

18

-- well, let me check one thing.

19

scheduled right now.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. ARNOLD:

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

Your trial?

You said the 17th.

10

14

Did you

Mr. Shaw has a trial

On the 24th?
Yes.
How about the 30th or 31st of

January?
MR. RICHARDS:

I'm gone that entire week, your

Honor, the 30th, the week of the 30th.
6
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THE COURT:

1
2

How about February 2, Ground Hog

day?

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. RICHARDS:

6

THE COURT:

7

10

Yeah, yeah.

Okay.

MR. ARNOLD:

I misspoke, I apologize, that's

court, so what was the day in January?
THE COURT:

In January, I had the 5th of

January, a Thursday, open.

13

MR. ARNOLD:

14

MR. RICHARDS:

15

Is that -And I could do that if we start

it at like 9:15.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. RICHARDS:

18

THE COURT:

19

How about the 7th of

when I actually start the murder trial in Judge Bean's

11
12

Oh, you're gone the whole week?

February?

8
9

I'm gone that whole week.

Or 9:30, I can give you 9:30.
9:30, would that work?

Do you want to try that, January

5th?

20

MR. ARNOLD:

Mr. Shaw told me, try not to set it

21

on that day, he's going to be out of town, so, he's quail

22

hunting.

23

THE COURT:

Did we try the second or third of

24

January, or did somebody -- I just hate to go too much

25

further out.
7
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

THE COURT:

3

The third I have a bench trial.

How about the second?

holiday?

4

MR. RICHARDS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. ARNOLD:

8

THE COURT:

You just got the day off.
So let's see, we're into February

MR. RICHARDS:

Other January days, none?

I

mean, I could do the 12th, 13th, 18th, 19th.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. ARNOLD:

14

Oh, that's right, New Year's, thanks

then, is that --

10
11

That's a holiday.

Wendy.

7

9

So that's a

I had 16, 17 open, but.
I think the 16th is going to be a

holiday as well.

15

THE COURT:

In February?

16

THE CLERK:

Yes.

17

THE COURT:

Oh, I'm sorry, I'm into February, I

18

thought February 16th and 17th, was that --

19
20

MR. ARNOLD:

THE COURT:

22

go much later.

23

months.

25

Those are dates of the murder

trial.

21

24

No, January.

Oh.

All right.

My gosh, I hate to

That's, November, December, that's four

MR. RICHARDS:

No other January dates like the

18th or 19th?
8
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1

MR. ARNOLD:

Let's see, January.

Well, the 18th

2

is our law and motion day, but I could do the 17th, but

3

you couldn't?

4

MR. RICHARDS:

5

MR. ARNOLD:

6

THE COURT:

7

That would work.
Oh, all right.

MR. RICHARDS:

9

THE COURT:

9:00

I can do nine on that day, yes.

All right.

10

MR. RICHARDS:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you think one day then?
Yeah, I would think so.

All right.

So we set January 17th,

which is a Tuesday, right?

15

MR. RICHARDS:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. RICHARDS:

18

THE COURT:

19

January 17th.

okay?

8

14

17th, I'm open.

Galindo.

At 9:00.

Nine a.m.
All day.

All right, got you a date there Mr.

I was starting to worry.

All right.

20

(Whereupon the matter was concluded.)

21

(Transcribed April 5, 2018)

22
23
24
25
9
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RANDALL W. RICHARDS #4503
Richards & Brown P.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
938 University Park Blvd #140
Clearfield, UT 84015
Telephone: (801) 773-2080
Fax: (801) 773-5078
E-mail: lawyers@richardsbrownlaw.com
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT
OF AND FOR COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEi. .

State of Utah
Plaintiff

v.
Case Number: 161901398
Judge: Direda

PATRICK GALINDO
Defendant

STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss
CO UNIT OF DAVIS

)

RANDALL W. RICHARDS, after being duly sworn upon his oath, states from
firsthand knowledge of the facts and circumstances that:
1.

I am a resident of the State of Utah, over the age of 18, and fully competent to
make this Affidavit.

2.

The matters stated below, unless stated to be made upon information and
belief, are based upon my own personal knowledge, and if I were called to
testify as a witness, I could and would competently attest thereto.

3.

I am the trial attorney of Patrick Galindo.

4.

During the proceeding it became abundantly apparent that Mr. Galindo was
intellectually disabled, and thus unable to assist with preparation for trial or

adequately be able to testify at trial.
5.

In conversing with Mr. Galindo, be did not appear to be able to understand
the proceedings, and clearly was not able to give me information about the
incident, making it impossible to gather adequate witnesses for the defense.

6.

He was able to converse with me, and always seemed happy, but certainly did
not understand the gravity of the offenses, and did not comprehend at all that
there was a real possibility of losing the trial.

7.

If had connected with Dr. Hawkes, I certainly would have been able to give

him information as to my frustrations in trying to prepare a defense for Mr.
Galindo due to bis inability to understand the gravity of the charges, and the
necessity of having my investigator contact witnesses to build a possible
defense.
8.

I also knew that attempting to put Mr. Galindo on the stand to testify in his
own behalf, which under normal circumstances would have been the logical
trial strategy given the nature of the offense and our claim that he was not
even there at the time, was impossible due to the intellectual disability, his
inability to understand complex questions, and his total inability to be able to
withstand any kind of cross examination.

9.

In my lengthy discussions with Mr. Galindo, I discovered that he would agree
to anything that I suggested. In fact in testing my hunch on this, I would ask
him two questions in a row, suggesting totally opposite answers, and he
would answer in the affirmative to both questions.

10.

Had I been able to convey this information to Dr. Hawkes, that may have
swayed his opinion on competency.

11.

I was also amiss in failing to bring in Dr. Hawkes or another psychologist to

inform the jury that Mr. Galindo was intellectually disabled, as that was one
of the key components of the facts raised at trial, and that information was

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Randall W Richards on this 10th
day of July:. 2018.
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